Philippa FootMoral Relativism1982.docx
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Philippa FootMoral Relativism1982.docx
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PhilippaFootMoralRelativism1982
[JackW.MeilandandMichaelKrausz,eds.,Relativism:
CognitiveandMoral,Indiana:
UniversityofNotreDamePress,1982][149]
INTRODUCTIONTO
MoralRelativism
Justastherearemanytypesofcognitiverelativism,sotherearemanydoctrineslabeled“moralrelativism.”PhilippaFootidentifiestheversionofmoralrelativismwhichsheconsidersimportantbysettingforthseveralfeatures:
(1)Therearewidevariationsinmoraljudgmentsbetweendifferentculturesanddifferentgenerations.
(2)Noonesetoftheseopinionsappearstohaveanymoreclaimtotruththananyother.(3)Theconceptsof“objectivity”and“truth”applytomoraljudgmentsonlywithinacommunityofsharedreactions,althoughthesejudgmentsdonotreportthesereactions.
Thatmoraljudgmentsarenotreportsofindividualorgroupreactions—forexample,“Ilikethis”or“mostofusapproveofthat”—isshownbythefactthatonecanmeaningfullyaccusebothindividualsandgroupsofbeingmistakenintheirmoraljudgments;iftheirmoraljudgmentswerereportsoftheirownreactions,theywouldpresumablyhavethelastwordonthis,sincetheyknowtheirownreactionsbest.Insteadofreportingreactions,moraljudgmentsareapplicationsofcommunityorgroupstandardstoindividualcases.Suchjudgmentsaretobeevaluated,accordingtotherelativist,onlyaccordingtothestandardsofthegrouporsocietyofwhichthepersonmakingthemoraljudgmentsisamember“withouttheslightestthoughtthat[those]standardsarecorrect.”Thereisnoabsolutelytruesetofmoralstandardsagainstwhichthestandardsofagroupcanbemeasuredandjudgedcorrectorincorrect.Infact,asFootpointsout,amoralrelativistcanevenholdthatmoraljudgmentsshouldbeevaluatedrelativetothestandardsoftheindividualmakingthejudgment,whetherornotthatindividual’sstandardsareidenticalwiththoseoftheindividual’sgroup.
Thus,theideaofrelativetruthfindsaplaceinthedoctrineofmoralrelativism,justasitdoesinthedoctrinesofsomecognitiverelativists.WearespeakinghereofwhatFootcalls“substantialtruth.”Therearevarious[150]usesoftheword‘true’.Forexample,apersonmaysayofajudgmentoftaste“That’sverytrue”merelytoindicatethespeaker’sagreementwiththejudgmentandnothingbeyondthat.Butthisisnotsubstantialtruth.Therelativisticdoctrineofsubstantialtruthisthat“truthisrelativetooneoranotherofasetofpossiblestandards.”Inmoralrelativismthestandardsaremoralprinciples;incognitiverelativismthestandardsarethoseembeddedinaconceptualframework.Nothingistruesimpliciterbutinsteadistruerelativetothisorthatsetofstandards.
Footgivesparticularattentiontoreplyingtosomecommonobjectionstomoralrelativisminordertoestablishrelativismasapositiontobetakenseriously.Thefirstobjectionisthattherelativistiscommittedtobelievingthatanactioncanberightinonecountryorperiodandwronginanother.Theideahereisthatsinceanactionmightberightbythestandardsofonecountryorperiodandwrongbythestandardsofanother,therelativistmustregardtheactionasbothrightandwrong,whichseemsparadoxicalandisperhapsevencontradictory.Astockrelativistreply,notmentionedbyFoot,tothiskindofobjectiongoeslikethis:
Thisiscertainlynotwhattherelativistbelieves;instead,therelativistbelievesthatthereisnoabsoluterightandwrong;rightandwrongmustberelativizedtostandards,withtheresultthatwhattherelativistbelievesisthattheactionisright-by-standards-S1andwrong-by-standards-S2.Nowthereisnocontradictionsincethepredicate“right-by-standards-S1”andthepredicate“wrong-by-standards-S2”donotcontradicteachother.(Notetheparallelherebetweenrelativerightandrelativetruth.)Footgivesadifferentreplytotheobjection.Whattherelativistbelieveswilldependonwhattherelativistjudges.Andarelativist’sjudgmentaboutajudgmentisalwaysmaderelativetoaparticularsetofstandards.Therelativist,liketherestofus,canonlyuseonesetofstandardsatatime.Andanactionwillbeeitherrightorwrongrelativetothesetofstandardsused,notbothrightandwrong.Hencetherelativistisabsolvedofcontradiction.
Asecondcommonobjectiontomoralrelativismisthatitisatotallysubjectivistdoctrine.Foritholdsthat“ifamanthinkssomethingright,itisrightforhim.”ThisclearlydoesnotapplytotheversionofmoralrelativismdevelopedbyFootinthispaper.Moralrightandwrongaredeterminedbyasetofstandards.Apersonmightbelievethatanactionisrightwhiletherelevantsetofstandardsyieldstheconclusionthattheactioniswrong.Inthiscasethepersonwronglybelievesthattheactionisright.Thus,anactionisnotrightforapersonjustbecausehethinksitis.
Finally,shedealswiththeobjectionthatamoralrelativistcanhavenomoralbeliefsofhisown.Whymightanyonethinkthisisso?
Perhapsitisbecauserelativistsallegedlybelievethatnomoraljudgmentistrue.Wemightfilloutthisargumentinthefollowingway:
tobelieveapropositionis[151]tobelievethatitistrue;consequently,arelativistwhobelievesthatnomoraljudgmentistruecannotconsistentlybelieveanymoraljudgment.Foot’sreplytothisisthatmoralrelativistsdobelievethatmoraljudgmentscanbetrue,butthatthistruthis“localtruth,”thatis,truthrelativeeithertolocalstandardsortoindividualstandards.Hencerelativistscanhavetheirownmoralbeliefs.
Havingansweredcommonobjectionsinordertoshowthatmoralrelativismmustbetakenseriously,Footaskswhethermoralrelativismofthetypeunderdiscussioniscorrect.Inotherwritingsshehasarguedthatthereareconstraintsonwhatcancountasamoralcode.Neverthelesstheseconstraintsallowtheexistenceofmorethanonemoralcode,anditisstillanopenquestionastowhetheronesuchcodeiscorrectandtherestmistaken.Footbelievesthattheresolutionofthisissuemustbeginfromwhatallhumanbeingshaveincommonandthat,toascertainthis,moralphilosophersmusttalk,muchmorethantheynowdo,about“thehumanheartandthelifeofmeninsociety.”
[152]
MoralRelativism
PhilippaFoot
Somephilosophicalquestionsinterestonlyphilosophers:
theywouldneveroccurtotheplainman,andifhehearsofthemhemayverywellthinkthatthosewhospendtheirtimeonphilosophymustbeatrifle[有点]mad.Thereare,however,otherproblems,nolessphilosophicalandjustasimportant,thatareapttopresentthemselvestoanyenquiringmind.Onedoesnothavetobeaphilosopherbytradeortrainingtohavedoubts,forinstance,aboutfreewill;andithasevenstruckmanyinnocentofphilosophythatperhapstheworldlooksundetectablydifferenttodifferentpersons,onemansystematicallyseeingasredwhattheotherseesasgreen.Thethesisofmoralrelativismisoneofthesenaturalphilosophicalthoughts.Verymanystudents,beginningphilosophy,aresurethatrelativismistrue;andalthoughtheyareoftentakenabackwhenremindedthatitis,forexample,commonformembersofourmaterialisticsocietytocriticisethissocietyforitsmaterialismtheyusuallythinkthatsomeadjustmentswillsavethetheory.Onemightthereforeexpectthatmoralrelativismwouldbeacentraltopicamongthosediscussedinclassesandinthejournals.Surprisingly,however,thetruthhasforlongbeenquiteotherwise.Manyrecentbooksonmoralphilosophyignoretheproblemorgiveitperfunctory[马马虎虎的]treatment,anditisonlyinthelasttwoorthreeyearsthatstrong,interesting,articleshavebeguntoappearinprint.
Whywasthesubjectsolongneglected?
Probablyitwasbecausefewofthoseteaching,andwriting,philosophybelievedmoralrelativismtobeanythingtheyneedworryabout:
somethoughttheyknewhowtodiscredititinafeweasymoves,andotherssupposedvaguelythatithadbeendone.[153]Infact,asweshallsee,therewereelementsintheprevailingtheoriesofethics—inemotivismforinstance—thatmadeitseemdifficulteventoformulaterelativismexceptinaversionthatwasindeedeasytorefute.
C.L.Stevensonisoneofthefewinfluentialmoralphilosophersofthepastthirtyorfortyyearstohavetreatedthesubjectofrelativismatanylength.Heargued,inanessaycalled‘Relativism’printedinFactsandValuesin1963,thathisown‘emotivist’theoryofmoraljudgmentgaveabasisfortherefutationofmoralrelativism.NowwhatStevensonactuallysaysaboutrelativism,whathetakesittobe,isratherodderthanmostpeoplerememberiftheyhavenotbeenreadinghimlately:
hesays,forinstance,thatanaccountofmoraljudgmenttaking‘Xisgood’tomeanthesameas‘IapproveofX’isnotrelativistic,whereasthesametheorywouldberelativisticifrequiringthespeaker’snametobeinsertedinsteadof‘I’.TheinterestofStevenson’sdiscussionisnot,however,inthesedetailsbutratherinacertainassumption;namelytheassumptionthatarelativistictheoryidentifiesamoralutterancewithanassertionofpsychologicalorsociologicalfact.Therelativistissupposedtoidentifythethoughtthatagivenactionismorallygoodorbadwithsomepropositionaboutthereactionsthatpeoplehavetoit;anditisonthisthatStevenson’s‘refutation’depends.Hepointsoutthattheidentificationmustbemistakenbecausethetwotypesofpropositionsarebackedupindifferentways.Ifsomeoneisaskedwhyhethinkscertainthingsmorallygoodorbadhedoesnotsetouttoshowthatsomeindividualorgroupreallydoeshavethisorthatreactiontoit,buttriestobringforwardfactsabouttheactionitself.Moreover,inputtingforw
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