7 Substantive canons.docx
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7 Substantive canons.docx
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7Substantivecanons
SubstantivecanonsofConstruction
∙Manyofthesesubstantivecanonstaketheformof"clearstatementrules"thatinstructcourtstoconstruestatutestopromoteafavoredvalueoravoidadisfavoredoneunlessthestatutesdemandsthecontrarywithgreaterclaritythanwouldordinarilyberequired.
∙Ruleoflenity:
Incriminallaw,statutesshouldbeinterpretedinfavorofDwhenthereisambiguity.
∙Whenweuseaclearstatementrule,itmustbethecasethatintheabsenceoftherulethecourtwouldhavereachedadifferentconclusion.
∙Avoidingseriousconstitutionalquestions
∙Thinkaboutwhetherorunderwhatconditions,itislegitimateforcourtstodevelopandapplysubstantivecanons.(howtojustify?
Congressionalintent?
)
∙Substantivecanonsmightalternativelybeunderstoodastechniquesthatcourtsemployinordertoadvanceparticularvaluesthatthecourtshavedeterminedareimportant,regardlessofthelikelypreferencesofCongress.
Avoidingseriousconstitutionalquestions
∙Marburyv.Madison(1803)
oThejudicialpowerincludesthepowertopassontheconstitutionalityoflegislation.
oAnactofthelegislature,repugnanttotheconstitution,isvoid.
∙PassingontheconstitutionalityofanActofCongressisthegravestandmostdelicatedutythattheCourtiscalledupontoperform.Thissenseperhapsreflectstheso-called"countermajoritariandifficulty"-thefeltrealitythatwhentheSupremeCourtdeclaresunconstitutionalalegislativeactortheactionofanelectedexecutive,itthwartsthewillofrepresentativesoftheactualpeopleofthehereandnow.Inlightofthisconcern,theSupremeCourthasexpressedastrongpresumptioninfavorofupholdingstatutesasconstitutional.
∙Ashwanderv.TennesseeValleyAuthority(1936)-JusticeBrandeis'sconcurrence
o4thrule[Whentointerpret]:
courtsshouldalwaystrytoresolveacaseonstatutory(orother)groundsbeforeaddressingconstitutionalobjections.
o7thrule[Howtoavoid]:
Ifthereisa"seriousdoubt"abouttheconstitutionalityofafederalstatute,thecourtshouldseewhether"aconstructionofthestatuteisfairlypossiblebywhichthequestionmaybeavoided."
∙Comparetheclassicconstitutionalavoidancecanonwiththemoderncanon:
oClassic:
Thecanoncanbeusedonlywhentheconstructionswouldbeactuallyunconstitutional. (doesnotallowthecourttoavoiddecidingtheconstitutionalissue)
oModern:
solongasthealternativeconstructionis"fairlypossible"unconstitutional.
∙Howandwhenshouldthecanonbeapplied?
Andwhatisitsproperscope?
NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.CatholicBishopofChicago(1979)
Issue:
DoestheBoardhavejurisdictionovertheteachersinschoolsoperatedbyachurch?
Andifdoes,doesitsexerciseviolatetheguaranteesoftheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment?
Majority:
∙Rule:
anActofCongressoughtnotbeconstruedtoviolatetheConstitutionifanyotherpossibleconstructionremainsavailable.
∙Ifweinterpretthestatutetosaythattheboardhasjurisdictionovertheteachers,wewouldberequiredtodecidewhetherthatwasconstitutionallypermissibleundertheReligionClausesoftheFirstAmendment.
∙Wedon’tinterpretastatuteinawaythatCongressdidn'thaveclearlyexpressedaffirmativeintentwhenitraisesaconstitutionalquestion.
∙TofindoutCongressionalintent,wecanlooktolegislativehistory:
o1935Act:
focusedonprivateindustryandindustrialrecovery;indicatinggivingnoconsiderationtochurch-operatedschools;
o1947Act:
excludednon-profitablehospitals
o1974Act:
removedtheexemptionin1947.
∙IntheabsenceofaclearexpressionofCongress'sintenttobringteachersinchurch-operatedschoolswithinthejurisdictionoftheBoard,wedeclinetoconstruetheActinamannerthatmayraiseconstitutionalproblem.
Dissent:
∙Bystrictlyorlooselyapplyingmajority’saffirmativeintentionrule,theCourtcanvirtuallyremakecongressionalenactments.
∙Courtshouldfirstdecidewhetheroneconstructionofthestatuteis“fairlypossible”.Itconfinesthejudiciarytoitsproperroleinconstruingstatutes,whichistointerpretthemsoastogiveeffecttocongressionalintention.
∙Butdefining“employer”toexcludeteachersinreligiousschoolisnotfairlypossible:
oThewordsofthestatuteonlycreate8exceptions,buttheMajorityistryingtomaketheninth.(expressiounius)
oLegislativehistoryindicatesteachersshouldbeincludedin“employees”.(p276-277)
oUnderprecedents,aslongasanemployeriswithinthereachofCongress’powerundertheCommerceClause,theCourthasheldhimtobecoveredbytheActregardlessofthenatureofhisactivity.
∙Itisirresponsibletoavoidtheconstitutionalquestionbyanexerciseinstatutoryinterpretationwhichsucceedsonlyindefyingcongressionalintent.
Notes:
∙Whencanaconstitutionalproblembeavoided?
oBrennan:
【Ambiguity-resolvingversion】onlywhentheinterpretationis“reasonable”or“fairlypossible.”(Whenthestatuteisambiguous.)
oBurger:
【Clearstatementversion】whentheinterpretationwouldraiseaseriousconstitutionalquestion.
oQuestions:
∙AccordingtoBrennan,whenthereisambiguity,shouldtheAvoidancecanonbeappliedfirst,orshouldthesemanticinterpretationgofirsttosolvetheambiguity?
∙Whatifthelanguageisambiguousbutthelegislativehistorymakesitclear?
∙JustificationsforAvoidanceCanon:
oCongressionalintent:
Itispresumedthatthelegislatorsdon’twanttoentertheconstitution“dangerzone”. Counterargument:
thisempiricalclaimisridiculousandisnottrue.
oThereisalegalfictiontoshowjudicialrespectforCongress.CourtshouldproceedasifCongressbehavedinthatpresumedway.Whydon’tpresumethatCongresshasalreadycarefullyconsideredtheconstitutionalquestion?
oAprudentialtoolofjudicialrestraint:
∙Constitutionaldecisionsarehardtoalter;andaregenerallymorelikelytoaffectotherareasoflaw.Therefore,Courtshouldberestrainttodecideonthesequestions.
∙Itisnotrestraint,butratherempowerment,because:
(1)Thecanonwillincludejudge’spreconstitutionalviewsaboutthestatuteswhichareunanticipatedbyCongress.
(2)Thecanonenlargestheabilityofjudgestorelyonconstitutionalconsiderationstokickoutcongressionalenactments.(3)Thejudgedecidesaconstitutionaldoubtnotactualconstitutionalviolation.Itreallygivesthejudgemorediscretiontoreachtheresulttheywant.
∙Clarifyingdifficultquestionsofconstitutionallawisthefunctionoffederalcourts.Courtsshouldnotavoidreachinganddecidingquestionsofconstitutionallaw.
oProtectingconstitutionalvalues:
∙ItactuallyenablesCourtstolimitthescopeorapplicationofcongressionalstatutes.
∙
(1)ThiscanongivesCourtsthemeanstoavoidgivingeffecttostatuteswithoutrequisitedegreeofcarefuldeliberationofCongress.Thecanonthusimproveslegislativeprocess.
∙
(1)IfJudgesaresupposedtobefaithfulagentsofCongress,itisproblematicforacourttorefusetoenforceastatuteaswrittenbecauseitconcludesCongressshouldhavebeenmorecareful.
∙
(2)TheConstitutionistoprotectcertainpublicvalues.CourtscanenforceandpromotethosevaluesbyreadingstatutesnarrowlytoavoidinterferingwithconstitutionalvaluesunlessCongresshasclearlyforcedtheissue.
∙
(2)IfthecourthasnotidentifiedanyactualviolationoftheConstitution,ifshouldnotadoptawiredmeaninginthenameofprotectingConstitutionalvalues.Itisawayforcourtstoescapefromdecidingtherealissue.
Classnotes:
Judgesdisagreeonwhenandhowtoapplythecanon
Statutoryobjectionfirstandthenconstitutionalobjection.Why?
Acourtcanholdastatuteunconstitutional.Butitisanextraordinarypower.Whenacourtholdastatuteunconstitutional,itmeansthecourtoverrulesastatutepassedbythemajorityofpeople.Itisreallyabigandseriousissue.Soifthecourtcanresolvetheissueonthestatutoryinterpretationlevel,thecourtdoesnotneedtoreachtheconstitutionalissue,anditdoesnotwanttogotothatleveleventhoughithasthatspecialpower.
Counter:
ButitisjusttheAmericansystem.Ifthecourthasthatpower,itshouldusethepowerwhennecessary.
NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.CatholicBishopofChicago(1979)
Dissent:
Ordinarymeaningof"employer"obviouslyincludesCatholicBishopinourcase.
Alsoinsection2,thedefinitionofemployer,thestatuteclearlylistseightexceptions.Butreligiousschoolisnotincluded.
Whenthestatutorytermisambiguous,weusetheavoidancecanon.Butthereisnoambiguity.
Majority:
Noclearexpressionofanaffirmativeintention
Whenweencounterabroadtermofthestatute,ifthebroadmeaningwouldpossiblyviolateconstitutionlaw,andthestatutedoesnotspecificallymentiontheissue,weshouldpresumethemeaningotherwise.
Why?
WeshouldassumeCongresstendstopassalawwithoutconstitutionalproblem.Soiftheynoticeaconstitutionalissue,theywouldusespecificlanguagetosayitclearly.Butiftheydonotspotit,weshouldpresumetheydonotnoticeitandtheywouldnotliketoraiseconstitutionalissue.
Dissent:
Whynot?
Youcannotfigureouttheclearlegislativeintent.Likeinthiscase,youthinkthelegislativeintentistoexcludereligiousschoolbasedontheavoidancecanon,butwethinkthelegislativeintentistoincludereligiousbasedonthetextofthestatute.Itishardtosaywhichisstronger.
ProtectingStateSovereigntyandAutonomy
1.Questionsabouttheappropriatebalancebetweenstateandfederalpower-andtheappropriateroleforthefederalcourtsinmaintainingthatbalance
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- Substantive canons