CJonesWord格式.docx
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CJonesWord格式.docx
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36(b)oftheInvestmentCompanyActof1940,15U.S.C.§
80a–35(b)(hereinafter§
36(b)).
I
A
TheInvestmentCompanyActof1940(Act),54Stat.789,15U.S.C.§
80a–1etseq.,regulatesinvestmentcompanies,includingmutualfunds.“Amutualfundisapoolofassets,consistingprimarilyof[a]portfolio[of]securities,andbelongingtotheindividualinvestorsholdingsharesinthefund.”Burksv.Lasker,441U.S.471,480(1979).Thefollowingarrangementsaretypical.Aseparateentitycalledaninvestmentadvisercreatesthemutualfund,whichmayhavenoemployeesofitsown.SeeKamenv.KemperFinancialServices,Inc.,500U.S.90,93(1991);
DailyIncomeFund,Inc.v.Fox,464U.S.523,536(1984);
Burks,441U.S.,at480–481.Theadviserselectsthefund’sdirectors,managesthefund’sinvestments,andprovidesotherservices.Seeid.,at481.Becauseoftherelationshipbetweenamutualfundanditsinvestmentadviser,thefundoften“‘cannot,asapracticalmatterseveritsrelationshipwiththeadviser.Therefore,theforcesofarm’s-lengthbargainingdonotworkinthemutualfundindustryinthesamemannerastheydoinothersectorsoftheAmericaneconomy.’”Ibid.(quotingS.Rep.No.91–184,p.5(1969)(hereinafterS.Rep.)).
“Congressadoptedthe[InvestmentCompanyActof1940]becauseofitsconcernwiththepotentialforabuseinherentinthestructureofinvestmentcompanies.”DailyIncomeFund,464U.S.,at536(internalquotationmarksomitted).Recognizingthattherelationshipbetweenafundanditsinvestmentadviserwas“fraughtwithpotentialconflictsofinterest,”theActcreatedprotectionsformutualfundshareholders.Id.,at536–538(internalquotationmarksomitted);
Burks,supra,at482–483.Amongotherthings,theActrequiredthatnomorethan60percentofafund’sdirectorscouldbeaffiliatedwiththeadviserandthatfeesforinvestmentadvisersbeapprovedbythedirectorsandtheshareholdersofthefund.See§
§
10,15(c),54Stat.806,813.
Thegrowthofmutualfundsinthe1950’sand1960’spromptedstudiesofthe1940Act’seffectivenessinprotectinginvestors.SeeDailyIncomeFund,464U.S.,at537–538.StudiescommissionedorauthoredbytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SECorCommission)identifiedproblemsrelatingtotheindependenceofinvestmentcompanyboardsandthecompensationreceivedbyinvestmentadvisers.Seeibid.Inresponsetosuchconcerns,CongressamendedtheActin1970andbolsteredshareholderprotectionintwoprimaryways.
First,theamendmentsstrengthenedthe“cornerstone”oftheAct’seffortstocheckconflictsofinterest,theindependenceofmutualfundboardsofdirectors,whichnegotiateandscrutinizeadvisercompensation.Burks,supra,at482.Theamendmentsrequiredthatnomorethan60percentofafund’sdirectorsbe“personswhoareinterestedpersons,”e.g.,thattheyhavenointerestinoraffiliationwiththeinvestmentadviser.115U.S.C.§
80a–10(a);
§
80a–2(a)(19);
seealsoDailyIncomeFund,supra,at538.Theseboardmembersaregiven“ahostofspecialresponsibilities.”Burks,441U.S.,at482–483.Inparticular,theymust“reviewandapprovethecontractsoftheinvestmentadviser”annually,id.,at483,andamajorityofthesedirectorsmustapproveanadviser’scompensation,15U.S.C.§
80a–15(c).Second,§
36(b),84Stat.1429,oftheActimposeduponinvestmentadvisersa“fiduciaryduty”withrespecttocompensationreceivedfromamutualfund,15U.S.C.§
80a–35(b),andgrantedindividualinvestorsaprivaterightofactionforbreachofthatduty,ibid.
The“fiduciaryduty”standardcontainedin§
36(b)representedadelicatecompromise.Priortotheadoptionofthe1970amendments,shareholderschallenginginvestmentadviserfeesunderstatelawwererequiredtomeet“common-lawstandardsofcorporatewaste,underwhichanunreasonableorunfairfeemightbeapprovedunlessthecourtdeemedit‘unconscionable’or‘shocking,’”and“securityholderschallengingadviserfeesunderthe[InvestmentCompanyAct]itselfhadbeenrequiredtoprovegrossabuseoftrust.”DailyIncomeFund,464U.S.,at540,n.12.Aimingtogiveshareholdersastrongerremedy,theSECproposedaprovisionthatwouldhaveempoweredtheCommissiontobringactionstochallengeafeethatwasnot“reasonable”andtointerveneinanysimilaractionbroughtbyoronbehalfofaninvestmentcompany.Id.,at538.ThisapproachwasincludedinabillthatpassedtheHouse.H.R.9510,90thCong.,1stSess.,§
8(d)(1967);
seealsoS.1659,90thCong.,1stSess.,§
8(d)(1967).Industryrepresentatives,however,objectedtothisproposal,fearingthatit“mightinessenceprovidetheCommissionwithratemakingauthority.”DailyIncomeFund,464U.S.,at538.
Theprovisionthatwasultimatelyenactedadopted“adifferentmethodoftestingmanagementcompensation,”id.,at539(quotingS.Rep.,at5(internalquotationmarksomitted)),thatwasmorefavorabletoshareholdersthanthepreviouslyavailableremediesbutthatdidnotpermitacompensationagreementtobereviewedincourtfor“reasonableness.”Thisisthefiduciarydutystandardin§
36(b).
B
PetitionersareshareholdersinthreedifferentmutualfundsmanagedbyrespondentHarrisAssociatesL.P.,aninvestmentadviser.PetitionersfiledthisactionintheNorthernDistrictofIllinoispursuantto§
36(b)seekingdamages,aninjunction,andrescissionofadvisoryagreementsbetweenHarrisAssociatesandthemutualfunds.ThecomplaintallegedthatHarrisAssociateshadviolated§
36(b)bychargingfeesthatwere“disproportionatetotheservicesrendered”and“notwithintherangeofwhatwouldhavebeennegotiatedatarm’slengthinlightofallthesurroundingcircumstances.”App.52.
TheDistrictCourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentforHarrisAssociates.ApplyingthestandardadoptedinGartenbergv.MerrillLynchAssetManagement,Inc.,694F.2d923(CA21982),thecourtconcludedthatpetitionershadfailedtoraiseatriableissueoffactasto“whetherthefeescharged…weresodisproportionatelylargethattheycouldnothavebeentheresultofarm’s-lengthbargaining.”App.toPet.forCert.29a.TheDistrictCourtassumedthatitwasrelevanttocomparethechallengedfeeswiththosethatHarrisAssociateschargeditsotherclients.Id.,at30a.Butinlightofthosecomparisonsaswellascomparisonswithfeeschargedbyotherinvestmentadviserstosimilarmutualfunds,theCourtheldthatitcouldnotreasonablybefoundthatthechallengedfeeswereoutsidetherangethatcouldhavebeentheproductofarm’s-lengthbargaining.Id.,at29a–32a.
ApaneloftheSeventhCircuitaffirmedbasedondifferentreasoning,explicitly“disapprov[ing]theGartenbergapproach.”527F.3d627,632(2008).Lookingtotrustlaw,thepanelnotedthat,whileatrustee“owesanobligationofcandorinnegotiation,”atrustee,atthetimeofthecreationofatrust,“maynegotiateinhisowninterestandacceptwhatthesettlororgovernanceinstitutionagreestopay.”Ibid.(citingRestatement(Second)ofTrusts§
242,andCommentf)).Thepanelthusreasonedthat“[a]fiduciarydutydiffersfromrateregulation.Afiduciarymustmakefulldisclosureandplaynotricksbutisnotsubjecttoacaponcompensation.”527F.3d,at632.Inthepanel’sview,theamountofanadviser’scompensationwouldberelevantonlyifthecompensationwere“sounusual”astogiverisetoaninference“thatdeceitmusthaveoccurred,orthatthepersonsresponsiblefordecisionhaveabdicated.”Ibid.
Thepanelarguedthatthisunderstandingof§
36(b)isconsistentwiththeforcesoperatinginthecontemporarymutualfundmarket.Notingthat“[t]odaythousandsofmutualfundscompete,”thepanelconcludedthat“sophisticatedinvestors”shopforthefundsthatproducethebestoverallresults,“mov[e]theirmoneyelsewhere”whenfeesare“excessiveinrelationtotheresults,”andthus“createacompetitivepressure”thatgenerallykeepsfeeslow.Id.,at633–634.ThepanelfaultedGartenbergonthegroundthatit“reliestoolittleonmarkets.”527F.3d,at632.AndthepanelfirmlyrejectedacomparisonbetweenthefeesthatHarrisAssociateschargedtothefundsandthefeesthatHarrisAssociateschargedothertypesofclients,observingthat“[d]ifferentclientscallfordifferentcommitmentsoftime”andthatcosts,suchasresearch,thatmaybenefitseveralcategoriesofclients“makeithardtodrawinferencesfromfeelevels.”Id.,at634.
TheSeventhCircuitdeniedrehearingenbancbyanequallydividedvote.537F.3d728(2008).Thedissentfromthedenialofrehearingarguedthatthepanel’srejectionofGartenbergwasbased“mainlyonaneconomicanalysisthatisripeforreexamination.”537F.3d,at730(opinionofPosner,J.).Amongotherthings,thedissentexpressedconcernthatHarrisAssociatescharged“itscaptivefundsmorethantwicewhatitchargesindependentfunds,”andthedissentquestionedwhetherhighadviserfeesactuallydriveinvestorsaway.Id.,at731.
WegrantedcertioraritoresolveasplitamongtheCourtsofAppealsovertheproperstandardunder§
36(b).2556U.S.___(2009).
II
SinceCongressamendedtheInvestmentCompanyActin1970,themutualfundindustryhasexperiencedexponentialgrowth.Assetsundermanagementincreasedfrom$38.2billionin1966toover$9.6trillionin2008.Thenumberofmutualfundinvestorsgrewfrom3.5millionin1965to92million
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