CARBON TARIFFS AND THE WTO AN EVALUATION OF FEASIBLE POLICIES.docx
- 文档编号:4097225
- 上传时间:2023-05-06
- 格式:DOCX
- 页数:67
- 大小:64.87KB
CARBON TARIFFS AND THE WTO AN EVALUATION OF FEASIBLE POLICIES.docx
《CARBON TARIFFS AND THE WTO AN EVALUATION OF FEASIBLE POLICIES.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《CARBON TARIFFS AND THE WTO AN EVALUATION OF FEASIBLE POLICIES.docx(67页珍藏版)》请在冰点文库上搜索。
CARBONTARIFFSANDTHEWTOANEVALUATIONOFFEASIBLEPOLICIES
WestlawDeliverySummaryReportfor29,IP
YourSearch:
TI("CARBONTARIFF")
Date/TimeofRequest:
Monday,November16,200907:
01Central
ClientIdentifier:
EASTCHINAUOFPOLITICS&LAW
Database:
WORLD-JLR
CitationText:
12JINTECL749
Lines:
2530
Documents:
1
Images:
0
Thematerialaccompanyingthissummaryissubjecttocopyright.UsageisgovernedbycontractwithThomsonReuters,Westandtheiraffiliates.
JournalofInternationalEconomicLaw
September,2009
GeneralArticle
*749CARBONTARIFFSANDTHEWTO:
ANEVALUATIONOFFEASIBLEPOLICIES
Paul-ErikVeel[FNa1]
Copyright©2009byOxfordUniversityPress;Paul-ErikVeel
ABSTRACT
BoththeEuropeanUnion,whichcurrentlyhasanemissionstradingschemeforgreenhousegases,andtheUSA,whichisconsideringimplementingsuchaprogram,areexploringthepossibilityofincludingforeignproducersinthatprogrambyrequiringimportersofforeigngoodstopaychargesrelatingtotheamountofCO2emittedintheproductionofthosegoods.ThisarticleexaminesthelegalityofsuchmeasuresunderWTOlaw.Whileacademicliteraturehasinrecentyearsconsideredcarbontariffsintheabstract,thisarticlecontextualizesthatdiscussionbyanalyzingEuropeanandAmericanproposalstoenactcarbontariffs,focusingprimarilyonthe2008Lieberman-WarnerBill.Thisarticleconcludesthatcarbontariffsare,subjecttoanumberofconstraints,generallypermissibleunderWTOlaw.However,italsoarguesthatwhilecarbontariffsmaygenerallybelegallypermissible,additionaldomesticpoliticalconstraintsmaysignificantlylimitthesetoflegalcarbontariffswhicharepracticallyfeasibleinanygivenstate.Thisarticlepositsthatanymeaningfuldiscourseoncarbontariffsmustincorporatebothpoliticalandlegalconstraints,anditseekstocontributetothisdiscoursebyidentifyingtherelevantconstraintsandexploringcertainpolicyoptionswhichcouldsatisfythoseconstraints.
I.INTRODUCTION
Asaresponsetoconcernsaboutanthropogenicclimatechangethroughgreenhousegasemissions,andinanattempttofulfilltheirobligationsundertheKyotoProtocol,anumberofjurisdictionshaveenactedorareconsideringenactingeithercap-and-tradeschemesforCO2emissionsorcarbontaxes.However,suchregimesimposeadditionalcostsondomesticproducersrelativetoforeignproducers,andthishasgivenrisetoconcernsaboutthecompetitivenessofdomesticfirmsand'leakage'ofcarbonemissionstootherjurisdictionswithlessstringentpolicies.Whilethereare*750anumberofpotentialpolicyresponsestotheseconcerns,[FN1]themeasurethathasbeenthemosthotlydebatedinrecentyearsandisthemostlikelytobeimplementedbystatesisa'carbontariff.'Aslegislativemeasurestoimplementsuchtariffsprogress,suchmeasuresareattractingincreasedscrutinyintermsoftheircompliancewithinternationaltradelaw;forexample,China,amajoropponentofcarbontariffs,hasstatedthatitbelievesthatcarbontariffswouldviolateWTOrules.[FN2]ThisarticlewillthoroughlyexaminethepermissibilityofsuchcarbontariffsunderWTOlaw.
Thescopeofthisarticleislimitedtodiscussingtheseso-called'carbontariffs,'whicharedefinedhereasanymeasurewhichimposesalevyonanimportedgoodonthebasisofeithertheCO2emittedintheproductionofthatgoodspecificallyorontheCO2emissionsorCO2emissionreductioneffortsoftheproducingcountrygenerally.Theterm'carbontariff'maybemisleading,assuchmeasuresarenotnecessarilytariffsinthetraditionalsense.Suchmeasuresare,asdiscussedbelow,generallybettercharacterizedaschargesleviedonimportswhicharemeanttoequalizethechargespaidbydomesticproducersfortheirCO2emissions.Notwithstandingthepotentialconfusion,giventhatthetermcarbontariffisoftenusedinpopularparlancetorefertosuchmeasures,thisarticleadoptsthatterm,hopingthatthisclarificationwillpreventconfusionthroughoutthisarticle.Thisarticledoesnotdiscussothersimilarbordercharges,suchasenergytaxadjustmentsattheborder,whichhavebeendiscussedelsewhere.[FN3]Italsodoesnotdiscussthetrade-relatedaspectsofothermeasuresstatesmightpotentiallytaketolimitgreenhousegasemissions,suchassubsidiesforgreentechnology[FN4]orotherdomesticregulatoryregimes.[FN5]Rather,itfocusesspecificallyoncarbontariffsasdefinedabove,assuchtariffshavebeen*751consideredinsomedepthoverthepastyearbyboththeUSAandtheEuropeanUnion(EU).
Whiletherehasbeenmuchliteratureinrecentyearsonthepermissibilityofcarbontariffs,thatliteraturehasgenerallyconsideredcarbontariffsintheabstract.ThisarticlewillcontextualizethatdiscussionbyanalyzingEuropeanandAmericanproposalstoenactcarbontariffs.Morespecifically,itwillprobethevalidityofcarbontariffsunderWTOlawthroughadetailedanalysisoftheprovisionsoftheLieberman-WarnerBill,abillproposedintheUSSenatein2007whichwouldhaveseentheintroductionofanAmericancarbontariff.Usingthisbillasafoil,thisarticleconcludesthatcarbontariffsare,subjecttoanumberofconstraintsontheexactstructureofthosetariffs,generallypermissibleunderWTOlaw.
However,italsoarguesthatwhilecarbontariffsmaygenerallybelegallypermissible,additionaldomesticpoliticalconstraintsmaysignificantlylimitthesetoflegalcarbontariffswhicharepracticallyfeasibleinanygivenstate.Thisarticlepositsthatanymeaningfuldiscourseoncarbontariffsmusttakeintoaccountbothpoliticalandlegalconstraints,anditseekstocontributetothisdiscoursebyidentifyingtherelevantconstraintsandexploringcertainpolicyoptionswhichcouldsatisfythoseconstraints.Astheprimarypurposeofthisarticleistoexaminethefeasibilityofsuchtariffs,thisarticledoesnotpurporttoreachanydefinitiveconclusionsontheultimatedesirabilityofenactingsuchtariffs.However,itdoesultimatelysuggestthatstatesshouldexercisecautioninenactingsuchtariffs.
Thisarticlewillproceedasfollows.Parttwoprovidesanoverviewoftheeconomicandpoliticaljustificationsforcarbontariffsaswellassomeoftheirpotentialpitfalls.PartthreeprovidesadetailedoverviewofclimatechangepolicyintheEUandtheUSA,withaparticularfocusonrecentproposalsforcarbontariffsfromthosejurisdictions.PartfourexaminesthelegalityofcarbontariffsunderWTOlawandexplorestheconstraintsthatWTOlawplacesontheirstructure.Partfivethenintegrateslegalandpoliticalconstraintsforthepurposeofbrieflyoutliningfeasiblepolicyoptionsfordealingwithcompetitivenessconcerns.Partsixthenprovidesabriefconclusion.
II.POLICYCONSIDERATIONSRELATINGTOCARBONTARIFFS
PriortoexaminingproposalsforcarbontariffsorexaminingtheWTO-legalityofsuchtariffs,itisimportanttounderstandwhycountriesareconsideringimposingsuchtariffs.Thissectionfirstexaminesthreereasonswhystatesmaydecidetoimposecarbontariffstocomplementdomesticcap-and-tradesystemsorcarbontaxes:
'leakage'ofCO2emissions,competitivenessconcerns,andpoliticaleconomyconsiderations.
Onerationaleadvancedforcarbontariffsisthattheyprevent'leakage'ofCO2emissionstoforeigncountriesthatdonothaveeffectivecap-and-tradesystemsorcarbontariffs.Thenotionhereisthatwithoutcarbontariffs,*752firms--especiallyinthoseindustrieswhichhaverelativelyhighCO2emissionswhichcannotbeabatedatlowcost--thatarerequiredtopaycarbontaxesorpurchaseemissionallowanceswhenoperatinginthatjurisdictionmayrelocatetoaforeignjurisdictionwhichdoesnotimposesimilarchargesonfirms'CO2emissions.[FN6]Producinginthatforeignjurisdiction,thefirmcanthenexportitsproductsbacktoconsumersinthejurisdictionwiththeCO2emissionschargeswhichitleft.Inthesecircumstances,theabatementofCO2emissionswhichthehomejurisdiction'semissionschargewassupposedtorealizedoesnotactuallyoccur,asthefirmhasavoidedthechargesbyrelocatingitsoperationsandmerelyemittingtheCO2inanotherjurisdiction.[FN7]Acarbontariffisintendedtolessenornegatethiseffectbyensuringthatfirmsproducingformarketsinaparticularjurisdictioncannotevadethechargesbyrelocatingtheiroperationstoaforeignjurisdiction.
Asecondandrelatedeconomicrationaleforcarbontariffsisthattheyensurethatforeignproducersincountrieswithoutcarbontaxesorequivalentschemesdonotbenefitfromanartificialcomparativeadvantagestemmingfrommorelaxregulationsongreenhousegasemissions.Thenotionofacomparativeadvantagerestsontheideathatthosecountriesthatareabletoproducecertaingoodsrelativelymoreefficientlythanothersshoulddoso.[FN8]Whilenormallyweviewitaseconomicallyoptimalforcountriestoexploitwhatevercomparativeadvantagetheymighthave,thecomparativeadvantageflowingfromamorepermissiveregimeforgreenhousegasemissionsisdifferentfromotherformsofcomparativeadvantage,asitresultsinthenegativeexternalityofincreasedglobalwarming.[FN9]Althoughitremainsdesirableforthosecountriesthatarerelativelymostefficientatproducingaparticulargoodtoproduceit,thenotionofefficiencynecessarilyneedstoincludethose*753externalitieswhichariseasaresultofthatproduction.CarbontariffseffectivelyforceforeignproducerstointernalizetheexternalityofCO2emissions,atleasttothesamedegreeasdodomesticproducers.
Whilebothoftheserationalesprovideeconomicjustificationsforcarbontariffs,muchof
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- CARBON TARIFFS AND THE WTO AN EVALUATION OF FEASIBLE POLICIES
链接地址:https://www.bingdoc.com/p-4097225.html