PARTⅡTrade theory ch811文档格式.docx
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PARTⅡTrade theory ch811文档格式.docx
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MD=D−SXS=S*−D*
Figure8-1DerivingHome’sImportDemandCurve
Todeterminetheworldpriceandthetradedquantity:
worlddemand=worldsupplyor∑D=∑Sor∑MD=∑XS
D+D*=S+S*
Figure8-3WorldEquilibrium
2.Effectsoftariff
AtariffraisethepriceinHomewhilelowerthepriceinForeign,PT=PT*+t.
ATariffinaLargeCountry
Thesizeofthiseffectontheworldpriceisoftenverysmall.For“smallcountry”,PT=PW+t.
ATariffinaSmallCountry
3.Measuringtheamountofprotection
Tariffsmayhaveverydifferenteffectsondifferentstagesofproductionofagood.
Nominaltariffmaynotreflecttheeffectiverateofprotection.
ERP=(VT−VW)/VW
VT:
valueaddedinthepresenceoftradepolicies
VW:
valueaddedatworldprice
E.g.X2andX3aretheinputsofX1,theinput─outputcoefficienta21=0.2,a31=0.3.Ift1=50%、t2=40%、t3=10%.HowmuchistheERPofX1?
VW=(1–0.2–0.3)=0.5VT={[(1+0.5)–0.2×
(1+0.4)–0.3×
(1+0.1)]–(1–0.2–0.3)}=0.89
ERP=(VT−VW)/VW=(0.89–0.5)/0.5=58%
2.Costsandbenefitsofatariff
1.Consumerandproducersurplus
Consumersurplusisequaltotheareaunderthedemandcurveandabovetheprice.
Producersurplusisequaltotheareaabovethesupplycurveandbelowtheprice.
Figure8-7Figure8-8
2.Measuringthecostsandbenefits
Figure8-9CostsandBenefitsofaTarifffortheImportingCountry
consumersurplus:
–(a+b+c+d)
producersurplus:
+a
governmentrevenue:
+(c+e)
nationalwelfare:
e–(b+d)
e:
termsoftradegain
b+d:
efficiencyloss(b:
productiondistortionloss;
d:
consumptiondistortionloss)
HowmuchdoesPWdecrease?
Itdependson:
“smallcountry”:
PW,T=PW,e=0;
eXS,eMD
Home’sgainfromtermsoftradeisattheexpenseofForeign’s“beggartheneighbour”
Thecostsandbenefitsanalysisabovearecorrectifonly:
(1)Thedirectgainstoproducersandconsumersinagivenmarketaccuratelymeasurethesocialgains.(withoutmarketfailure)
(2)Adollar’sworthofbenefitstoeachgroupisthesame.
3.Otherinstrumentsoftradepolicy
1.Exportsubsidies:
Theory
Whenthegovernmentoffersanexportsubsidy,shipperswillexportthegooduptothepointwherethedomesticpriceexceedstheforeignpricebytheamountofthesubsidy,PS=PS*+S
Anexportsubsidyraisespriceinexportingcountrywhileloweringtheminimportingcountry.
Figure8-11EffectsofanExportSubsidy
–(a+b)·
–(b+d+e+f+g)
+(a+b+c)–(b+d):
consumptionandproductiondistortionlosses
governmentsubsidy:
–(b+c+d+e+f+g)(e+f+g):
termoftradeloss
Casestudy:
Europe’scommonagriculturepolicy
AgriculturalpricesarefixednotonlyaboveworldmarketlevelsbutabovethepricethatcleartheEuropeanmarket.Aexportsubsidyisusedtodisposeoftheresultingsurplus.
Figure8-12Europe’sCommonAgriculturalProgram
Thereasonstosubsidy:
economicsifscale;
economicgrowthandemployment;
strategy
2.ImportQuotas:
Animportquotawillraisedomesticpricebythesameamountasatariffthatlimitsimportstothesamelevel.
AQuotainaSmallCountry
AQuotainaLargeCountry
Thedifferencebetweenaquotaandatariffisthataquotathegovernmentreceivesnorevenue.Themethodtoallocatethequotadetermineswhogetsthequotarents.Thesemethodsare:
a.competitiveauction
b.allocatetosomebodyfirmly
c.orderlyapplicationofusingresources
Inassessingthecostsandbenefitsofanimportquota,itiscrucialtodeterminewhogetstherents.
CASESTUDY:
AnImportQuotainPractice:
U.S.Suager(P190-191)
3.VoluntaryExportRestraints
AVERisaquotaimposesfromtheexportingcountry’ssideinsteadoftheimporter’s.
AVERisexactlylikeanimportquotawhichthelicenseareassignedtoforeigngovernment.
VERSaremuchmorecostlythantariffs.
ImportquotasandVERSaremuchmorestrictthantariff,becausetheexportercan’tincreasethequantityofexportinggoodseveniftheyhavegreatadvantagesinpriceandquality.
4.LocalContentRequirement
Localcontentrequirement:
Specifiedfractionofafinalgoodmustbeproduceddomestically.
Localcontentlawshavebeenwidelyusedbydevelopingcountriestryingtoshifttheirmanufacturingfromassemblybackintointermediategoods.
Fromthepointofviewofthedomesticproducersofparts,itprovidesprotectioninthesamewayanimportantquotadoes.
Fromthepointofviewofthefirmsthatmustbuylocally,theeffectivepriceofinputsisanaverageofthepriceofimportedanddomesticallyproducedinputs.
Alocalcontentrequirementproducesneithergovernmentrevenuenorquotarents.Thefinalpriceispassedontotheconsumers.
5.OtherTradepolicyinstruments
Exportcreditsubsidies
Nationalprocurement
Red-tapebarriers
4.Theeffectofatradepolicy:
ASummary
Table8-1EffectsofAlternativeTradePolicies
Tariff
Exportsubsidy
Importquota
VER
Producersurplus
Increases
Consumersurplus
Falls
Government
Falls
Nochange
revenue
(government
(rentsto
(rentsto
spendingrises)
licenseholders
foreigners)
Overallnational
Ambiguous
welfare
(fallsfor
(fallsfor
smallcountry)
smallcountry)
Chapter9
ThePoliticalEconomyofTradePolicy
*Whydocountriesperusetradepoliciessuchastarifforimportquota,whichproducemorecoststhanbenefits?
——tradepolitics.
(1)Thecasefor/againstfreetrade
(2)Incomedistributionandtradepolicy
(3)Internationalnegotiationsandtradepolicy
1.Thecaseforfreetrade
1.Freetradeandefficiency(“static’s”gains)
Amovetofreetradeeliminatestheproductionandconsumptiondistributioncausedbytradeprotectionandincreasenationalwelfare.(Table9-1)
2.Additionalgainsfromfreetrade(“dynamic”gains)
(1)Economiesofscale:
Freetradecandeterexcessiveentryandtheresultinginefficientscaleofproduction.
(2)Learningandinnovation:
Freetradeprovidesanincentivetoseeknewwaystoexportorcompetewithimports,offersmoreopportunitiesforlearningandinnovation.
3.Politicalargumentforfreetrade
Apoliticalcommitmenttofreetrademaybeagoodideainpracticeeventhoughtheremaybebetterpoliciesinprinciple:
Anygovernmentagencyattemptingtoperuseasophisticatedprogramofinterventionintradewouldprobablybecapturedbyinterestgroupsandconvertedintoadeviceforredistributionincometopoliticallyinfluentialgroups.
2.Nationalwelfareargumentagainstfreetrade
Deviationsfromfreetradecansometimesincreasenationalwelfare.
1.Thetermsoftradeargumentforatariff
Forasufficientlysmalltariffthetermsoftradegainoflargecountrymustoutweightheefficiencyloss.
Figure9A-2WelfareEffectsofaTariff
Gain–Loss=ut–vt2=–v(t–u/2v)2+u2/4v
Figure9-2TheOptimumTariff
Theoptimumtariffrate(to=u/2v)isalwayspositivebutlessthantheprohibitiverate(tp):
0<
to<
tp.Thelargerexs,thesmallerto.
Thetermsoftradeargumentagainstfreetradeisintellectuallyimpeccablebutofdoubtfulusefulness.
for“smallcountry”:
Thereisnotermsoftradegains.
for“largecountry”:
AcycleofretaliatorytrademoveswouldunderminethecoordinationininternationaltradepolicysuchasWTO,etc.
2.Thedomesticmarketfailureargumentagainstfreetrade.
Domesticmarketfailure:
duallabormarket;
imperfectcapitalmarket;
technologicalspillover,∙∙∙∙∙∙
Technologicalspillovercaseforprotection
Iftheproductionofagoodyieldsexperiencethatimprovethetechnologyoftheeconomyasawholebutthefirmscan’tgetthisbenefit(themarketfailureofexternality),asufficientlysmalltariffthatyieldsmarginalsocialbenefitmustoutweightheefficiencyloss.
Figure9-3TheDomesticMarketFailureArgumentforaTariff
TRADEPOLICY(tariff):
P:
+(a+b)
C:
-(a+b+c+d)
MSB:
+e
N:
e-(b+d)
3.Howconvincingisthemarketfailureargument?
(1)·
”Specificrule”:
domesticmarketfailureshouldbecorrectedbydomesticpoliciesaimeddirectlyattheproblem’ssources.
Ifthesameproductionincrease(S1toS2)wereachievedviaaproductionsubsidyratherthanatariff,theconsumptionlossbwillbeavoided.Figurer9-3.
Tradepoliciesarealways“second-best”ratherthan“first-best”policies——eventhoughthecostofthetradepoliciesarelessapparent.
Mostdeviationsfromfreetradeareadoptednotbecausetheirbenefitexceedtheircostsbutbecausethepublicfailstounderstandtheirtruecosts.
(2)Economistscan’tdiagnosemarketfailurewellenoughtoprescribepolicy.
Wagedifferentialscaseforprotection:
AtarifftoprotecturbanindustrialsectorsinLDCSwilldrawtheunemployedintoproductiveworkandthusgeneratesocialbenefitsthatmorethancompensateforitscost.
However,thispolicywillencouragesomuchmigrationtourbanareasthatunemploymentwill,infact,increase.
Thedifficultyofascertainingtherightsecond-
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