法哲学百科全书Word文档下载推荐.docx
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法哲学百科全书Word文档下载推荐.docx
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TableofContents
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1.AnalyticJurisprudence
Theprincipalobjectiveofanalyticjurisprudencehastraditionallybeentoprovideanaccountofwhatdistinguisheslawasasystemofnormsfromothersystemsofnorms,suchasethicalnorms.AsJohnAustindescribestheproject,analyticjurisprudenceseeks“theessenceornaturewhichiscommontoalllawsthatareproperlysocalled”(Austin1995,p.11).Accordingly,analyticjurisprudenceisconcernedwithprovidingnecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheexistenceoflawthatdistinguishlawfromnon-law.
Whilethistaskisusuallyinterpretedasanattempttoanalyzetheconceptsoflawandlegalsystem,thereissomeconfusionastoboththevalueandcharacterofconceptualanalysisinphilosophyoflaw.AsBrianLeiter(1998)pointsout,philosophyoflawisoneofthefewphilosophicaldisciplinesthattakesconceptualanalysisasitsprincipalconcern;
mostotherareasinphilosophyhavetakenaturn,incorporatingthetoolsandmethodsofthesciences.Toclarifytheroleofconceptualanalysisinlaw,BrianBix(1995)distinguishesanumberofdifferentpurposesthatcanbeservedbyconceptualclaims:
1.totracklinguisticusage;
2.tostipulatemeanings;
3.toexplainwhatisimportantoressentialaboutaclassofobjects;
and
4.toestablishanevaluativetestfortheconcept-word.
Bixtakesconceptualanalysisinlawtobeprimarilyconcernedwith(3)and(4).
Inanyevent,conceptualanalysisoflawremainsanimportant,ifcontroversial,projectincontemporarylegaltheory.Conceptualtheoriesoflawcanbedividedintotwomainheadings:
(a)thosethataffirmthereisaconceptualrelationbetweenlawandmoralityand(b)thosethatdenythatthereissucharelation.Nevertheless,RonaldDworkin’sviewisoftencharacterizedasathirdtheorypartlybecauseitisnotclearwherehestandsonthequestionofwhetherthereisaconceptualrelationbetweenlawandmorality.
a.NaturalLawTheory
AllformsofsubscribetotheOverlapThesis,whichisthatthereisanecessaryrelationbetweentheconceptsoflawandmorality.Accordingtothisview,then,theconceptoflawcannotbefullyarticulatedwithoutsomereferencetomoralnotions.ThoughtheOverlapThesismayseemunambiguous,thereareanumberofdifferentwaysinwhichitcanbeinterpreted.
ThestrongestformoftheOverlapThesisunderliestheclassicalnaturalismofandWilliamBlackstone.AsBlackstonedescribesthethesis:
Thislawofnature,beingco-evalwithmankindanddictatedbyGodhimself,isofcoursesuperiorinobligationtoanyother.Itisbindingoveralltheglobe,inallcountries,andatalltimes:
nohumanlawsareofanyvalidity,ifcontrarytothis;
andsuchofthemasarevalidderivealltheirforce,andalltheirauthority,mediatelyorimmediately,fromthisoriginal(1979,p.41).
Inthispassage,Blackstonearticulatesthetwoclaimsthatconstitutethetheoreticalcoreofclassicalnaturalism:
1)therecanbenolegallyvalidstandardsthatconflictwiththenaturallaw;
and2)allvalidlawsderivewhatforceandauthoritytheyhavefromthenaturallaw.Onthisview,toparaphraseAugustine,anunjustlawisnolawatall.
RelatedtoBlackstone’sclassicalnaturalismistheneo-naturalismofJohnFinnis(1980).FinnisbelievesthatthenaturalismofAquinasandBlackstoneshouldnotbeconstruedasaconceptualaccountoftheexistenceconditionsforlaw.AccordingtoFinnis(seealsoBix,1996),theclassicalnaturalistswerenotconcernedwithgivingaconceptualaccountoflegalvalidity;
rathertheywereconcernedwithexplainingthemoralforceoflaw:
“theprinciplesofnaturallawexplaintheobligatoryforce(inthefullestsenseof“obligation”)ofpositivelaws,evenwhenthoselawscannotbededucedfromthoseprinciples”(Finnis1980,pp.23-24).OnFinnis’sviewoftheOverlapThesis,theessentialfunctionoflawistoprovideajustificationforstatecoercion.Accordingly,anunjustlawcanbelegallyvalid,butcannotprovideanadequatejustificationforuseofthestatecoercivepowerandishencenotobligatoryinthefullestsense;
thus,anunjustlawfailstorealizethemoralidealsimplicitintheconceptoflaw.Anunjustlaw,onthisview,islegallybinding,butisnotfullylaw.
LonFuller(1964)rejectstheideathattherearenecessarymoralconstraintsonthecontentoflaw.OnFuller’sview,lawisnecessarilysubjecttoaproceduralmoralityconsistingofeightprinciples:
P1:
therulesmustbeexpressedingeneralterms;
P2:
therulesmustbepubliclypromulgated;
P3:
therulesmustbeprospectiveineffect;
P4:
therulesmustbeexpressedinunderstandableterms;
P5:
therulesmustbeconsistentwithoneanother;
P6:
therulesmustnotrequireconductbeyondthepowersoftheaffectedparties;
P7:
therulesmustnotbechangedsofrequentlythatthesubjectcannotrelyonthem;
P8:
therulesmustbeadministeredinamannerconsistentwiththeirwording.
OnFuller’sview,nosystemofrulesthatfailsminimallytosatisfytheseprinciplesoflegalitycanachievelaw’sessentialpurposeofachievingsocialorderthroughtheuseofrulesthatguidebehavior.Asystemofrulesthatfailstosatisfy(P2)or(P4),forexample,cannotguidebehaviorbecausepeoplewillnotbeabletodeterminewhattherulesrequire.Accordingly,Fullerconcludesthathiseightprinciplesare“internal”tolawinthesensethattheyarebuiltintotheexistenceconditionsforlaw:
“Atotalfailureinanyoneoftheseeightdirectionsdoesnotsimplyresultinabadsystemoflaw;
itresultsinsomethingthatisnotproperlycalledalegalsystematall”(1964,p.39).
b.LegalPositivism
Opposedtoallformsofnaturalismis,whichisroughlyconstitutedbythreetheoreticalcommitments:
(i)theSocialFactThesis,(ii)theConventionalityThesis,and(iii)theSeparabilityThesis.TheSocialFactThesis(whichisalsoknownasthePedigreeThesis)assertsthatitisanecessarytruththatlegalvalidityisultimatelyafunctionofcertainkindsofsocialfacts.TheConventionalityThesisemphasizeslaw’sconventionalnature,claimingthatthesocialfactsgivingrisetolegalvalidityareauthoritativeinvirtueofsomekindofsocialconvention.TheSeparabilityThesis,atthemostgenerallevel,simplydeniesnaturalism’sOverlapThesis;
accordingtotheSeparabilityThesis,thereisnoconceptualoverlapbetweenthenotionsoflawandmorality.
i.TheConventionalityThesis
AccordingtotheConventionalityThesis,itisaconceptualtruthaboutlawthatlegalvaliditycanultimatelybeexplainedintermsofcriteriathatareauthoritativeinvirtueofsomekindofsocialconvention.Thus,forexample,H.L.A.Hart(1996)believesthecriteriaoflegalvalidityarecontainedinaruleofrecognitionthatsetsforthrulesforcreating,changing,andadjudicatinglaw.OnHart’sview,theruleofrecognitionisauthoritativeinvirtueofaconventionamongofficialstoregarditscriteriaasstandardsthatgoverntheirbehaviorasofficials.WhileJosephRazdoesnotappeartoendorseHart’sviewaboutamasterruleofrecognitioncontainingthecriteriaofvalidity,healsobelievesthevaliditycriteriaareauthoritativeonlyinvirtueofaconventionamongofficials.
ii.TheSocialFactThesis
TheSocialFactThesisassertsthatlegalvalidityisafunctionofcertainsocialfacts.Borrowingheavilyfrom,JohnAustin(1995)arguesthattheprincipaldistinguishingfeatureofalegalsystemisthepresenceofasovereignwhoishabituallyobeyedbymostpeopleinthesociety,butnotinthehabitofobeyinganydeterminatehumansuperior.OnAustin’sview,aruleRislegallyvalid(thatis,isalaw)inasocietySifandonlyifRiscommandedbythesovereigninSandisbackedupwiththethreatofasanction.Therelevantsocialfactthatconfersvalidity,onAustin’sview,ispromulgationbyasovereignwillingtoimposeasanctionfornoncompliance.
HarttakesadifferentviewoftheSocialFactThesis.HartbelievesthatAustin’stheoryaccounts,atmost,foronekindofru
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