IMF-具有国家或有终端价值的公共与私人资本成本(英)-2023.3.pdf
- 文档编号:18634467
- 上传时间:2023-08-23
- 格式:PDF
- 页数:27
- 大小:1.29MB
IMF-具有国家或有终端价值的公共与私人资本成本(英)-2023.3.pdf
《IMF-具有国家或有终端价值的公共与私人资本成本(英)-2023.3.pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《IMF-具有国家或有终端价值的公共与私人资本成本(英)-2023.3.pdf(27页珍藏版)》请在冰点文库上搜索。
PublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValueLucianoGrecoandMarianoMoszoroWP/23/WP/23/56IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023MAR*TheauthorsaregratefultoAnthonyBoardman,ChenChen,EduardoEngel,RonaldFischer,MikhailFreer,AlexanderGaletovic,VitorGaspar,RickGeddes,JoshuaGoldman,PaulGrout,XuehuiHan,ShafikHebous,DejanMakovsek,EmanueleMassetti,RyotaNakatani,SamPeltzman,JohnRyan,DavidVanSlyke,andJean-FrancoisWenforcomments,andtoseminaraudiencesatCornellUniversity,SciencesPo,SGH-WarsawSchoolofEconomics,andtheIMF.LucianoGrecoacknowledgesfinancialsupportfromCRIEP(Inter-UniversityResearchCentreonPublicEconomics),UniversityofPadua.MarianoMoszoroacknowledgesfinancialsupportfromthe“MIURProjectDepartmentofExcellence”ofthedSEA(DepartmentofEconomicsandManagement),UniversityofPadua.Datasharingisnotapplicabletothisarticleasnonewdatawerecreatedoranalyzedinthisstudy.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/56IMFWorkingPaperFiscalAffairsDepartmentPublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValuePreparedbyLucianoGrecoandMarianoMoszoro*AuthorizedfordistributionbyRodrigoCerdaMarch2023IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:
Theeconomicdebateunderlinesthereasonswhydiscountratesofinfrastructureprojectsshouldbesimilar,regardlessthepublicorprivatesourceoffinancing,duringtheforecastperiodwhenflowsareriskybutpredictable.Incontrast,weshowthattheincompletenessofcontractsbetweengovernmentsandprivatefirmsbeyondtheforecastperiod(i.e.,whenflowsofnetsocialbenefitsarestate-contingent)entailsexpectedterminalvaluesthataresystematicallylargerundergovernmentratherthanprivatefinancing.Thiseffectprovidesanewrationaleforapplyingalowerdiscountrateintheassessmentofprojectsunderpublicfinancingascomparedtoprivatefinancing.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:
Greco,Luciano,andMarianoMoszoro,“PublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValue,”IMFWorkingPapers2023/056(Washington:
InternationalMonetaryFund).JELClassificationNumbers:
H43,L32,L97Keywords:
Socialdiscountrate;publicutilities;privatefinancingofinfrastructures;public-privatepartnershipsAuthorsE-MailAddress:
Luciano.grecounipd.it;Mmoszoroimf.orgWORKINGPAPERSPublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValuePreparedbyLucianoGrecoandMarianoMoszoro11TheauthorsaregratefultoAnthonyBoardman,ChenChen,EduardoEngel,RonaldFischer,MikhailFreer,AlexanderGaletovic,VitorGaspar,RickGeddes,JoshuaGoldman,PaulGrout,XuehuiHan,ShafikHebous,DejanMakovsek,EmanueleMassetti,RyotaNakatani,SamPeltzman,JohnRyan,DavidVanSlyke,andJean-FrancoisWenforcomments,andtoseminaraudiencesatCornellUniversity,SciencesPo,SGH-WarsawSchoolofEconomics,andtheIMF.LucianoGrecoacknowledgesfinancialsupportfromCRIEP(Inter-UniversityResearchCentreonPublicEconomics),UniversityofPadua.MarianoMoszoroacknowledgesfinancialsupportfromthe“MIURProjectDepartmentofExcellence”ofthedSEA(DepartmentofEconomicsandManagement),UniversityofPadua.Datasharingisnotapplicabletothisarticleasnonewdatawerecreatedoranalyzedinthisstudy.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValueINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2ContentsI.Introduction.3II.AFinancialModelofInfrastructureProjects.7III.ATheoryofEndogenousExpectedTerminalValue.10A.PublicFinancing.11A.1EfficientGovernment.11A.2InefficientPublicRevamping.12B.PrivateFinancing.13B.1UnverifiableState-ContingentInvestment.14B.2VerifiableState-ContingentInvestment.15B.3PublicVersusPrivateFinancingWhenPublicRevampingisInefficient.17CFinancialAssessmentofInfrastructureProjectsRevised.18IV.Conclusion.19References.21FIGURES1.TheCycleofInvestmentinaPublicInfrastructure.8TABLES1.DiscountRatesUsedinVfMbyPPPUnits.4IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValueINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3I.IntroductionPublicgoods,suchasservicesfrompublicinfrastructuresandutilities,canbealternativelyprovidedbygovernmentorprivatefirms.Thoughpublicprovision(orpublicfinancing)involvestraditionalprocurementofinputsoverthepublicinvestmentlifecyclefromdifferentprivatefirmse.g.,constructionand,sometimes,operationservicesstrategicmanagement,financing,andmostofinvestmentandoperationrisksremaintothepublicsector.Incontrast,withtheprivateprovisionofpublicinfrastructuresandutilities(orprivatefinancing)thegovernmentcontractsoutwithinasinglepublic-privatepartnership(PPP)contracte.g.,toaconsortiumofprivatefirmsseveralphasesoftheinvestmentcycle,includinglong-runmaintenanceandmostoffinancingneedsand,thus,transferstotheprivatesectoralargershareofinvestmentandoperationalrisks(Engel,FischerandGaletovic2014).1Thechoiceofthepublicsectororprivate-sectorprovisionofpublicgoodsisdrivenbydifferentialsincapitaloutlays,operatingmargins,riskmanagement,andcostofcapital.Budgetconstraintsaside,privateprovisionispreferablewhenaprivate-sectorinvestorcanbuildthenecessaryinfrastructurecheaper,providetheserviceatloweroperatingcost,arrangebetterfinancingterms,orcombineofthesefactorsthatresultinhigherpresentvaluethanthepublic-sectoralternative.Whilethereisaconsensusonthecalculationofinvestmentandoperatingefficiencyalbeitambiguousempiricalresultsare(HodgeandGreve2007)theeconomicsprofessionisstillinconclusiveonwhetherthegovernmentfinancingofaprojectthatgeneratesastreamofnetsocialbenefitsi.e.,socialbenefitsnetofsocialcostsshouldimplyalowerdiscountratethantheprivatefinancingofthesameproject.2BoardmanandHellowell(2017)presentasurveyofdiscountratesinValue-for-Money(VfM)appraisalpracticesbyPPPagencies.InninejurisdictionsineightdevelopedcountrieswithgovernmentPPPunits,fourconceptuallydifferenttypesofdiscountratesareused(seeTable1).3Almostalljurisdictionsapplyacommondiscountratetoprojectflowsofnetsocialbenefitsregardlessofthesourceoffinancing.OnlyAustraliaappliesdifferentsystematicrisk-adjusteddiscountratestoVfMappraisals,withthepublic-sectorcomparator(PSC)ratelowerthanthePPPrate.Fromanormative(welfareeconomics)pointofview,ArrowandLind(1970),Baumol(1968),Fisher(1973),Samuelson(1964),Solow(1965),andVickrey(1964)claimedthatthediscountrateforthepublicsectorshould1Privatefinancingmayalsoinvolveprivateownershipofinfrastructures,whichistypicallynotthecaseincivillawcountries.Publicorprivateownershipdoesnotaffectouranalysisandmainconclusions.2Itisusefultopointoutthatthecostofcapital(ordiscountrate)isspecifictotheprojectand,particularly,itisrelatedtothevolatilityofeconomicflows(i.e.,benefitsandcosts).3PrivateinvestmentsintollhighwaysandbridgesintheUSamountstobillionsofdollars.Surprisingly,theUSDepartmentofTransportationinitslatestguidelinesforPPPsdevotesonlyoneparagraphtoVfMandomitsthediscussionofdiscountratesoverall(cf.“SuccessfulpracticesforP3sAreviewofwhatworkswhendeliveringtransportationviapublic-privatepartnerships.”Technicalreport,USDepartmentofTransportation,FederalHighwayAdministration.March2016).IMFWORKINGPAPERSPublicversusPrivateCostofCapitalwithState-ContingentTerminalValueINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4belowerthanfortheprivatesector.Thepublicsectorcanbetterabsorbandspreadrisksamongagreaternumberofindividuals(ArrowandLind,1970;Fisher,1973).Publicprojectsthatarecomplementarytoprivateinvestmentsshouldapplylowerdiscountratesthanprojectsthatwouldreplaceprivateinvestmentstopartiallyundothedistortionsfromotherpublicpoliciesthatdiscourageprivateinvestments(OguraandYohe,1977).Privatecompaniesreturnscomeonlyfromtheprojectscashflowsandcannotinternalizealltheexternalitiesgeneratedbytheproject;moreover,privateinvestmentscreateexternalitiesthatleadtoinefficientpiece-mealdecision-making(FlemmingandMayer,1997).Thus,theflowsofnetsocialbenefitsofthelattershouldbediscountedatahigherdiscountratetoavoidthisdistortion.Table1.DiscountRatesUsedinVfMbyPPPUnitsNote:
ThistablepresentsanoverviewofthediscountratesinValue-for-Money(VfM)appraisalpracticesinninejurisdictionsineightdevelopedcountrieswithinstitutionalizedpublic-privatepartnership(PPP)programs.Whencapitalmarketsareincomplete,investorsareunabletohedgethemselvesagainstinvestmentriskfullyandthereforeapplyvariousriskpremia.Grout(2003)arguedthateveninaworldwithcompletemarketsandnodistortingtaxation,thedifferentialinthevolatilityforgovernmentpaymentsunderprivateprovisionishigherthanthevolatilityofgovernmentexpenditures
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- IMF 具有 国家 终端 价值 公共 私人 资本 成本 2023.3