外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc
- 文档编号:1826917
- 上传时间:2023-05-01
- 格式:DOC
- 页数:12
- 大小:288KB
外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc
《外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《外文翻译公司治理对资本结构和企业价值关系的影响.doc(12页珍藏版)》请在冰点文库上搜索。
毕业设计(论文)
外文翻译
题目公司治理对企业价值的影响
专业财务管理
班级10财管1班
学生姜波(21002137)
指导教师王向静
职称讲师
高科学院
2014年
Theinfluenceofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue
Capitalstructure:
relationwithcorporatevalueandmainresearchstreams
Whenlookingatthemostimportanttheoreticalcontributionsontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,asillustratedinFigure1,itbecomesimmediatelyevidentthatthereisasubstantialdifferencebetweentheearlytheoriesandthemorerecentones.
ModiglianiandMiller(1958),whohadoriginallyassertedthattherewasnorelationshipbetweencapitalstructureandvalue;in1963,instead,reachedtheparadoxicalandprovocativeconclusionthatamaximumlevelofdebtwouldmeanamaximumleveloffirmvalue,duetothefactthatinterestistaxdeductible.Manylatercontributionspointedoutthatthiseffectiscompensatedwhenconsideringpersonaltaxes(Miller,1977),aneventuallackoftaxcapacity,duetothepresenceofeconomicloss,theeffectofothertypesoftaxshields(DeAngeloandMasulis,1980),aswellastheintroductionofthecosts(directandindirect)offinancialdistress;allthesesituationsendupcreatingatrade-offbetweendebtcostsandbenefits.PointL’inFigure1cindicatesanoptimallevelofdebt,beyondwhichanyriseinleveragewouldcauseanincreaseinthebenefitsofdebtthatwouldbelessthanproportionalwithrespecttothecostsoffinancialdistress.Furthermore,thisnonmonotonicrelationwouldbemodifiedevenmorewhenconsideringagencycostsaswellasthecostsoffinancialdistress.Finally,onelaststreamofresearch(Myers,1984,Myers1984)pointsoutmanagerialpreferenceswhenchoosingfinancingresources.Inthiscasenooptimallevelofdebtbecomes‘‘objectively’’evident,butthisisduetothevarioussituationsthemanagerhadtodealwithovertime.Thefunctionofmanagerialpreferencehasparticularrelevanceduetoinformationasymmetries,thereforetheleveloffirmindebtednesswillbedeterminedbythetangentbetweenthefirmvaluefunctionandthecurveofmanagerindifference.
Furthermore,itcanbeobservedthatdebtincreasesincorrespondencewiththebetterthefirm’sreputationisonthemarket(Chevalier,1995).Researchhasshownsimilaritiesbetweenfirmsthatbelongtothesamesector(TitmanandWessels,1988);inotherwords,capitalstructuretendstobeindustry-specific.
Theempiricalcomparisonbetweenthetrade-offtheoryandthepeckingordertheoryseemstobecontroversial.Ononehand,empiricalevidenceshowsmoderatecoherencewiththetrade-offtheory,whenrevenueandagencyproblemsaretakenintoconsiderationcontextually;ontheotherhand,thenegativerelationbetweenleverageandfirmprofitdoesnotseemtosupportthetrade-offtheory,asitconfirmsahierarchicalorderinfinancialdecisionmaking.
Itis,thus,clearthatthetopicofcapitalstructureisanythingbutdefinedandthattherearestillmanyopenproblemsregardingit.
Asmanyauthorshavenoted(RajanandZingales,1995)capitalstructureisa‘‘hot’’topicinfinance.Byanalyzinginternationalliteraturethemainresearchprioritiesandnewanalyticalapproachesarerelatedto:
theimportantcomparisonbetween‘‘rational’’and‘‘behavioural’’finance(BarberisandThaler,2002);alivelycomparisonmadebetweenthepeckingordertheoryandthetrade-offtheory(Shyam-SunderandMyers,1999);theattempttoapplythesetheoriestosmallfirms(BergerandUdell,1998,Fluck,2001);theroleofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue(Heinrich,2000,BhagatandJefferis,2002,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005).
Thebehaviouralapproach,thatconsidersthepeckingorderoffinancialresourcesintermsof‘‘irrational’’preferences,causedanimmediatereactionfromStewartMyersin2000and2001andjointlywithShyam-Sunderin1999(Myers,2000;2001;Shyam-SunderandMyers,1999).StewartMyersisthefounderofthepeckingordertheory[7].Problemsofinformationasymmetry,togetherwithtransactioncosts,wouldbeabletoofferarationalexplanationtomanagerialbehaviourwhenfinancialchoicesaremadefollowingahierarchicalorder(FamaandFrench,2002).Inotherwords,accordingtoMyersandFama,thereshouldbea‘‘rational’’explanationtothephenomenonobservedbyStein,Baker,Wrugler,BarberisandThaler.
Moreover,studiesoncapitalstructurehavealsobeendonelookingatsmallandmediumsizefirms(BergerandUdell,1998,Michaelasetal.,1999,Romanoetal.,2000,Fluck,2001),duetotherelevanteconomicroleofthesefirms(inEuropetheyare95percentofthetotalfirmsoperating).Zingales(2000)aswellhasemphasizedthefactthattoday‘‘...theattentionshowntowardslargefirmstendstopartiallyobscurefirmsthatdonothaveaccesstothefinancialmarkets...’’.Inoneofthemostinterestingstudiesdoneonthistopic,BergerandUdell(1998)assertedthatfirmfinancialbehaviourdependsonwhatphaseoftheirlifecycletheyarein.Infact,thereshouldbeanoptimalpro-temporecapitalstructure,relatedtothephaseofthelifecyclethatthefirmisin.
Finally,theobservationsofMichaelJensen(1986),madethroughouthismanycontributionsoncorporategovernance,aswellasthoseofWilliamson(1988),haveencouragedalineofresearchthat,revitalizedinthesecondpartofthenineties,seemstobequitepromisingasameanstoanalyzehowcorporategovernancedirectlyorindirectlyinfluencestherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue(Fluck,1998,Zhang,1998,Myers,2000,DeJong,2002,BergerandPatti,2003,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005).Insynthesis,itispossibletoaffirm,asitfollows,thatajoinedanalysisofcapitalstructureandcorporategovernanceisnecessarywhendescribingandinterpretingthefirm’sabilitytocreatevalue(Zingales,2000,Heinrich,2000,BhagatandJefferis,2002).Thistypeofconsiderationcouldhelpovercomethecontroversyfoundwhenstudyingtherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,onbothatheoreticalandempiricallevel.
Influenceofcorporategovernanceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue.
Capitalstructurecanbeanalyzedbylookingattherightsandattributesthatcharacterizethefirm’sassetsandthatinfluence,withdifferentlevelsofintensity,governanceactivities.Equityanddebt,therefore,mustbeconsideredasbothfinancialinstrumentsandcorporategovernanceinstruments(Williamson,1988):
debtsubordinatesgovernanceactivitiestostrictermanagement,whileequityallowsforgreaterflexibilityanddecisionmakingpower.Itcanthusbeinferredthatwhencapitalstructurebecomesaninstrumentofcorporategovernance,notonlythemixbetweendebtandequityandtheirwellknownconsequencesasfarastaxesgomustbetakenintoconsideration.Thewayinwhichcashflowisallocated(cashflowright)and,evenmoreimportantly,howtherighttomakedecisionsandmanagethefirm(votingrights)isdealtwithmustalsobeexamined.Forexample,venturecapitalistsareparticularlysensitivetohowcapitalstructureandfinancingcontractsarelaidout,sothatanoptimalcorporategovernancecanbeguaranteedwhileincentivesandchecksformanagementbehaviorarewellestablished(Zingales,2000)[10].
Coase(1991),inasortofcritiqueonhisownworkdonein1937,pointsoutthatitisimportanttopaymoreattentiontotheroleofcapitalstructureasaninstrumentthatcanmediateandmoderateeconomicaltransactionswithinthefirmand,consequently,betweenentrepreneursandotherstakeholders(corporategovernancerelations).
AsexplicitlypointedoutbyBhagatandJefferis(2002),whentheypayparticularattentiontotherelationsbetweencauseandeffectandtotheirinteractionsrecentlydescribedonatheoreticallevel(Fluck,1998,Zhang,1998,Heinrich,2000,Brailsfordetal.,2004,Mahrt-Smith,2005),a‘‘researchproposal’’thatfutureempiricalstudiesshouldevaluateshouldbe,howcorporategovernancecanpotentiallyhavearelevantinfluenceontherelationbetweencapitalstructureandvalue,withaneffectofmediationand/ormoderation.
ThefiverelationsidentifiedinFigure2describe:
therelationbetweencapitalstructureandfirmvalue(relationA)througharoleofcorporategovernance‘‘mediation’’;therelationbetweencapitalstructureandfirmvalue(relationA)throughtheroleofcapitalgovernance‘‘moderation’’(relationD);theroleofcorporategovernanceasadeterminingfactorinchoicesregardingcapitalstructure(relationE).
AllfiverelationsshowninFigure2areparticularlyinterestingandshowtwothreadsofresearchthatfocusontherelationsbetween:
corporategovernanceandcapitalstructure,wherethedimensionsofthecorporategovernancedeterminefirmfinancingchoices,causingapossiblerelationofco-causationWhethermanagementvoluntarilychoosestousedebtasasourceoffinancingtoreduceproblemsofinformationasymmetryandtransaction,maximizingtheefficiencyofitsfirmgovernancedecisions,ortheincreaseinthedebtlevelisforcedbythestockholdersasaninstrumenttodisciplinebehaviorandassuregoodcorporategovernance,capitalstructureisinfluencedbycorporategovernance(relationE)andviceversa(relationB).
Ononehand,achangeinhowdebtandequityaredealtwithinfluencesfirmgovernanceactivitiesbymodifyingthestructureofincentivesandmanagerialcontrol.If,throughthemixdebtandequity,differentcategoriesofinvestorsallconvergewithinthefirm,wheretheyhavedifferenttypesofinfluenceongovernancedec
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 外文 翻译 公司 治理 资本 结构 企业 价值 关系 影响