1、原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review. AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises （SMEs） are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade cr
2、edit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firm
3、s choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we
4、 argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SMEs confirms that the co
5、mposition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SMEs the main sources of financing are equity （internally generated cash）, trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choic
6、e of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision o
7、f extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest sourc
8、e.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SMEs in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types o
9、f financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this a
10、rea focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small fin
11、ancially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firms products. Trade credits are offered to the b
12、uyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal
13、the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their qua
14、lity.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade c
15、redits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool （if all buyers are offered the same terms） in favor o
16、f borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institution
17、s suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of
18、 performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash req
19、uired on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions hav
20、e advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The
21、 financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in
22、 this market? Petersen and Rajan 1997 briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the le
23、nders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders.
24、The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheap
25、er than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower
26、 only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher
27、 price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their
28、suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm. That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered al
29、so puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due
30、to the issuers general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more tha
31、n the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the col
32、lateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk varia
